Russia’s war against Ukraine is now two years in, leading to increased sanctions and export controls against both Moscow and Vladimir Putin’s allies. However, American technology is still making its way into Russian weapons. 

“The evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that Russia relies on Western technology to power its military capabilities and United States companies produce the majority of components found in Russian weapons,” Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., said. 

Blumenthal travelled to Ukraine, where he said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy gave him a report that contained a list of 211 American manufactured chips, semiconductors and other technology in numerous Russian missiles and other high-tech products used on the battlefield. 

According to the report, 87 of the pieces were made by four companies: Intel, AMD, Analog Devices and Texas Instruments. 

American manufacturers are fueling and supporting the growing and gargantuan Russian war machine.

Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn.

“American manufacturers are fueling and supporting the growing and gargantuan Russian war machine,” Blumenthal said. “We know that these semiconductors are manufactured by United States companies and they either know or should know what’s happening.”

Straight Arrow News reached out to the companies asking specific questions about their efforts to comply with U.S. sanctions and exports controls. 

Intel said in a statement it “promptly suspended all shipments to customers in both Russia and Belarus following the outbreak of war. Intel continues to comply with all applicable export regulations and sanctions in the countries in which it operates, and Intel’s contracts require its customers and distributors to comply with the same regulations. Intel actively and diligently works to track and mitigate potential distributor issues and has zero tolerance for circumvention of its requirements.”

Texas Instruments said it is cooperating with the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and has a dedicated team that actively and carefully monitors the sale and shipment of their products as part of a “robust” global trade compliance program.

“TI strongly opposes the use of our chips in Russian military equipment and the illicit diversion of our products to Russia. We stopped selling products into Russia in February 2022. Any shipments of TI chips into Russia are illicit and unauthorized,” a TI spokesperson said in a statement.

Analog Devices Inc. (ADI) said it takes significant and proactive measures to mitigate gray market risks and actively monitors the Ukrainian National Agency on Corruption Prevention’s War & Sanctions website and database. In addition, ADI said it is using a third party system to search the internet for products posted for sale by unauthorized sellers.

“ADI does not condone or support the use of our products for end applications for which they were not intended or authorized, nor do we condone or support the illicit diversion of our products to countries or entities subject to U.S. or international sanctions.”

Industry advocates have said Russia is able to acquire some of the semiconductors by repurposing those found in household appliances like washing machines. A witness cast doubt on that. 

“It makes little sense that Russia would buy a $500 washing machine for a $1 part that they could obtain more easily otherwise,” Damien Spleeters, deputy director of Operations Conflict Armament Research, said. “Some of these chips, of course, can also fit household appliances, but others cannot unless your washing machine can fly.”

Spleeters investigates weapons diversion in conflicts around the world. According to Spleeters, some of the components his organization analyzed were made after the war began and after sanctions were put in place. 

“More and more now, we are seeing components that are produced after February 2022,” Spleeters said during a Senate Homeland Security subcommittee hearing. “And that should be a concern for manufacturers.”

“So we’re seeing these components in weapons manufactured after the beginning of the war and after the sanctions were imposed,” Blumenthal asked. 

“Correct,” Spleeters answered. 

To prevent Russia from obtaining this technology, the witnesses suggest increasing funding to the agencies in charge of export control enforcement, closing loopholes by making rules more consistent between different jurisdictions and increasing multilateral cooperation which could include entering into an export control treaty.