Divesting from counterterrorism would be costly mistake for US

The United States government is divesting from counterterrorism. Why? The threat of a transnational attack against the United States itself or American interests abroad, is significantly lower than in previous years. And policymakers have rightly understood that the United States faces much more significant challenges from China and Russia, to name a few. They’ve thus moved to invest in ways to make the United States more competitive on the global stage, particularly in the American military’s high-end capabilities, as warnings of potential war with China escalate.
But a complete shift away is unwise and making a mistake similar to the one made in the decade after the 9/11 attacks, when other strategic priorities slipped far below counterterrorism. First, the security Americans feel today comes in part from the ongoing pressure on al-Qaeda and the Islamic State abroad. Across the globe, a fraction of the troops the United States has deployed in support of NATO or even stationed in Japan, support U.S. counterterrorism activities. They work primarily with U.S. partners, who are the ones doing most of the fighting on the ground. Some of those partners have made good progress, others less so.
Some may say the local fights have nothing to do with the United States. While in many ways true, rarely have global jihadist elements not taken advantage of these conflicts. And U.S. partners often cannot hold their own ground without assistance from the United States in some form. As the case in Somalia shows, the difference between keeping a small counterterrorism footprint and pulling out entirely is stark. President Biden reversed President Trump’s troop withdrawal, reinserting just 500 troops. Since that decision in May 2022, the U.S.-trained Somali special operations forces have taken back a third of al-Shabaab’s territory.
While supporting counterterrorism partners does not guarantee a victory against al Qaeda or the Islamic State, it does keep them under pressure. Second, U.S. counterterrorism assistance doesn’t just aid it in the fight against terrorists. It’s a key way the United States develop and deepens relationships with many of its partners in Africa and the Middle East who share an interest in countering these groups. A counterterrorism presence also puts Americans in the field, places where they wouldn’t be otherwise, and lets them observe more nefarious activities unrelated to counterterrorism. And the U.S. support helps set a framework while engagements advance America’s liberal values.
In an era of competing for global influence, that is no small task. Russia has leaned in to filling the counterterrorism void left as the United States tries to reduce commitments. But Russian involvement doesn’t mean that counterterrorism actually gets done. In Libya, Russians entered under the guise of counterterrorism and are now primarily stationed around oil and gas resources, rather than fighting terrorism. Russian assistance ultimately has more to do with evading sanctions, buying international support, and securing other interests rather than advancing global security. The United States no longer needs to spend billions on counterterrorism. That period has passed. But in reducing counterterrorism investments, the United States should be careful that the resource pendulum doesn’t swing too far the other way. For just a small investment, the United States can keep global pressure on al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, while also competing with China and Russia.